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Abstract 
The theory of linear inequalities and linear programming was recently applied to study the 
stable marriage problem which until then has been studied by mostly combinatorial methods. 
Here we extend the approach to the general stable matching problem in which the structure of 
matchable pairs need not be bipartite. New issues arise in the analysis and we combine linear 
algebra and graph theory to explore them. 
1. Introduction 
The stable matching problem describes a situation where agents are to be matched 
while having preferences over potential mates. The data for the model consists of a set 
of agents, a set of pairs of agents that are matchable and a list of strict preference 
orders of the agents over their matchable mates. The goal is to find a stable matching, 
i.e., a matching such that no two agents prefer each other over their respective 
outcome in the matching, where singlehood is considered to be worse than being 
paired with a matchable mate. This model includes the original stable marriage 
problem and stable roommates problem introduced by Gale and Shapley [7] as special 
cases. In the stable roommates problem all possible pairs are admissible, whereas in 
the stable marriage problem the agents are labeled either as men or women and only 
man-woman pairs are allowable. 
It was observed by Gale and Shapley [7] that stable matching problems that arise 
from certain two-sided markets, e.g., matching students to colleges, can be modeled as 
stable marriage problems. Further, they described an algorithm that computes 
a stable matching for any given stable marriage problem. Roth [16] discovered that 
essentially the same algorithm has in fact been in use since 1952, ten years before the 
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seminal paper of Gale and Shapley was published, by the National Resident Matching 
Program to assign medical students to their hospital residencies. Continuing work, 
e.g., [ 173, demonstrates the applicability and importance of stable matching problems. 
Gale and Shapley [7] also obtained an example of a stable roommates problem 
which has no stable matching. Irving [lo] gave the first polynomial algorithm that 
finds a stable matching for a stable roommates problem or determines that no such 
matching exists, and Gusfield and Irving [S] extended this algorithm to a general 
stable matching problem. Alternative algorithms are presented in Abeledo [l]. For 
more on stable matchings and stable marriages, see the books by Knuth [14], 
Gusfield and Irving [S], Roth and Sotomayor [19], and the references therein. 
Despite their apparent simplicity, stable matching problems have a wealth of 
structural properties. For the past three decades the general approach for exploring 
these properties has relied mostly on combinatorial arguments. A new approach for 
studying the stable marriage problem was recently introduced by Vande Vate [21], 
who characterized stable marriages via the extreme points of a certain polytope when 
the number of men and women coincide, singlehood is prohibited and preferences are 
complete. The result was modified and extended to cover the general case via 
a simplified proof in Rothblum [20]. Vande Vate’s approach was inspired by earlier 
work of Irving et al. [l 11, who showed how to reduce the stable marriage problem to 
a minimum cut problem such that stable marriages correspond to the s-t minimum 
cuts. Roth et al. [ 1 S] used the theory of linear inequalities and of linear programming 
to obtain new results and to derive new proofs of known results for the stable 
marriage problem. It is our purpose here to combine this linear algebraic approach 
with some elements of graph theory to study the stable matching problem. 
In Section 2 we define a polytope, for each particular stable matching problem, that 
we call the fractional stable matching polytope. We show that this polytope contains the 
incidence vectors of all stable matchings of the problem. Further, we prove that the 
extreme points of the fractional stable matching polytope are always half-integral and 
we specify other structural properties of this polytope. There is an interesting relation 
between the results we obtain for fractional stable matching polytopes and classic 
results concerning the polytopes associated with matching problems. In Sections 3 and 
4 we apply linear programming theory to obtain new proofs of known results on stable 
matchings and to extend these results to all points of the fractional stable matching 
polytope. For example, we show that the median (properly defined) on each triplet of 
points in the polytope is also in the polytope. Finally, in Section 5 we obtain a character- 
ization of the extreme points of the fractional stable matching polytope. 
2. Preliminaries and background 
In this section we review some known results on polytopes associated with match- 
ings on graphs. We then formally define stable matching problems using graph- 
theoretic terminology. 
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We begin by summarizing some basic definitions of graph theory. A graph G is an 
ordered pair (V, E), where Vis a finite set called the set ofvertices and E is a subset of 
{{u, w}: u, w E V} called the set of edges. Let G = (V, E) be a graph. A graph 
G’ = (V’, E’) is a subgraph of G, denoted by G’ s G, if V’ c V and E’ G E. Vertices 
u and u are adjacent in G if (u, v} E E. For v E V, we denote by N(v) the set of neighbors 
of v, i.e. N(u) = {u: {v, U> E E}. We say that vertex v and edge e are incident if 21 E e. 
Two distinct edges having nonempty intersection are called adjacent. Let E’ E E. We 
denote by & the vertices that are contained in the edges of E’. Then, GE’ 3 ( VE,, E’) is 
called the subgraph ofG spanned by E’. 
Let G=(V,E) be agraphand let ul,v2,... , vk be distinct vertices in V such that 
E’ = {{vi, v2}, {u2, v3}, . . . . {z+_i, ok}} G E. Then GE’ is a path with end vertices 
v1 and vk. Further, if e = {vi, vk} E E, then GE’” lei is a cycle. Thus, a path (cycle) is 
determined by an ordered list of its vertices where any two consecutive vertices are 
adjacent in the path (cycle). A cycle is called odd or even according to the number of 
edges it contains. Of course, the number of edges of a cycle is equal to the number of its 
vertices. A graph is connected if for every pair of distinct vertices u and v there is a path 
with end vertices u and v. A connected component of a graph G is a maximal connected 
subgraph of G. A graph is bipartite if its vertex set V can be partitioned into two sets 
such that there are no edges whose two vertices are in the same set. It is well known 
that a graph is bipartite if and only if its does not contain an odd cycle. 
A matching in a graph G = (V, E) is a set of edges p s E such that no two edges 
have a common vertex. A matching p defines a one-to-one mapping ,u(.) from the set 
V onto itself where p(v) = u if {u, u} E p an p(u) = v if no edge in p contains v. We call 
p(u) the outcome of u under the matching p. Given a matching p we say that a vertex 
v is single or unmatched in p if ,u(v) = v. Otherwise, we say that v is matched and ,u(v) is 
then called the mate of v in ~1. In this case, we say that u is matched to p(u) in p. Each 
matching can also be represented by an incidence vector x = (x,+,)(,,,) E E E (0, 1 jE, 
whose coordinates are indexed by the edges of the graph and x,,, = 1 if (u, v} E ,u, 
and x,,, = 0 otherwise. The matching polytope of a graph G, denoted M(G), is 
defined by 
M(G) = conv{x E RE: x is the incidence vector of a matching in G}, 
where “con? refers to the convex hull. The incidence vectors of the matchings in G are 
known to constitute the extreme points of M(G). 
We define the support of a nonnegative vector x E RE as the set of edges 
E+(x) = {{u, v} E E: x,,, > 0). Also, for x E RE and 6 E R, we define the set of 
edges E6(x) = {{u, v} E E: x,,, = S}. Henceforth, we shall only consider vectors 
x in RE such that 0 < x d 1. We call such vectors half-integral if they belong to 
(0, l/2, 1)“. 
The following classic theorems deal with the description of matching polytopes 
using systems of linear inequalities. 
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Theorem 2.1 (Birkhoff [4]). Let G = (V, E) be a bipartite graph, then the matching 
polytope M(G) is the set of solutions of the following linear inequality system: 
c x,,,dl foreachvEV 
u E N(c) 
for each {u, v} E E (2) 
In the case of nonbipartite graphs constraints (1) and (2) are insufficient for 
describing the matching polytope and one has to introduce additional constraints. 
Theorem 2.2 (Edmonds [S]). Let G = (V, E) b e a graph, then the matching polytope 
M(G) is the set of solutions of the system of linear inequalities consisting of(l), (2), and 
c x,,, d f(lSl - 1) f or each S & V with ISI odd and ISI > 3. (3) 
{u,u} E E: u,u E S 
The constraints of (3) are called the “odd set” constraints. Their removal for 
a nonbipartite graph will result in a larger polytope than the one defined by (1) and (2) 
and this larger polytope will have some nonintegral extreme points. We remark that 
Theorem 2.2 gives an NP-description of the matching polytope (see [15]), i.e., given 
a graph G, a vector a E RE and a scalar b E R we can determine in polynomial time 
whether the inequality ax b b belongs to the class of inequalities characterizing the 
matching polytope M(G) via Theorem 2.2. 
The polytope defined by (1) and (2), for an arbitrary graph G, is called the fractional 
matching polytope of the graph G and is denoted FM(G). A vector x E FM(G) is called 
afractional matching. The following result characterizes the extreme points of FM(G). 
Theorem 2.3 (Balinski [3]). Let G = (V, E) be a graph and let x belong to FM(G). Then 
x is an extreme point of FM(G) if and only tfx is half-integral and the set of edges 
EIIZ(x) spans vertex disjoint odd cycles. 
It is useful for our analysis of stable matching problems to view them from a graph 
theoretic perspective. Any stable matching problem can be represented by a pair 
(G; P), where G = (V, E) is a graph and P is a mapping on V such that, for each vertex 
v E V, P(v) is a strict linear order on N(u) u {u} which has v as the last element in the 
order. In this case we call G the acceptability graph, P the preference profile and P(v) 
the preference of vertex v. In particular, we refer to a stable matching problem (G; P) 
as a stable marriage problem when its acceptability graph is bipartite and a corres- 
ponding bipartition of V into two vertex sets, M for “men” and W for “women”, is 
specified. 
Let (G; P) be a stable matching problem. For v E V, we represent P(o) by listing the 
vertices in N(v) in decreasing preference order. It is not necessary to include v itself in 
the list since we know it is always last. We call this list v’s preference list and we call the 
collection of the preference lists for all u E V the preference table of the problem (G; P). 
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We also denote P(u), the preference of 0, by <“; in particular, for u, win N(u) u {u}, we 
write u + w if P(u) orders w before U, i.e. if v prefers w to U. Note that, as <” ranks 
u last, we have that u >I? u for each u E N(u). We express by u 6, t that either u <” t or 
u = t. Finally, for a vertex u and a nonempty set of vertices S c N(u), let max, S and 
min, S denote, respectively, the most preferred and the least preferred element in 
S with respect to the preference +. Further, we define max, $!J = min,@ = {u}. 
A pair {u, v} E E is a blocking pair for a matching p if 
Au) G, u and p(u) ca u, 
i.e., {u, u} is a blocking pair for p if both vertices prefer being matched to each other 
over their outcome under p. A matching ,U is stable if it has no blocking pair. 
Equivalently, ,U is a stable matching for (G; P) if the following stability condition holds 
for each (u, v} E E: 
P(U) 2, u or p(u) 3, u. (4) 
Gale and Shapley [7] proved that a stable matching problem with a bipartite 
acceptability graph always has a stable matching. The following result by Abeledo 
and Isaak [2] shows that if the acceptability graph is not bipartite, then there is 
a preference profile for which no stable matchings exists. The proof is included here for 
the sake of completeness. 
Theorem 2.4. Let G be a graph. Then (G; P) h as a stable matching under all projiles P if 
and only if G is bipartite. 
Proof. The Gale-Shapley algorithm guarantees existence of a stable matching when 
the graph G is bipartite; see Gale and Shapley [7]. To prove necessity, assume G is 
nonbipartite. Then G has an odd cycle, say ulvz, . . . , vzp+ 1. We will show there is 
a profile for which there is no stable matching in G. Consider the profile defined by the 
following rule: for a vertex v $ {ur , .. . , vzp+ 1}, let 
P(u) = any ordering of N(v) 
andfori=1,...,2p+l,let 
P(u~)= Ui+l,Ui-l, followed by any ordering of N(Ui)\{Ui-1, Vi+,}, 
where vO = vZp + 1 and vZpfZ = vr. Consider a matching p. Then there is at least one 
vertex among { ur , . . . ,v~~+~} which will not b e matched to another vertex on the 
cycle. Without loss of generality, we can assume that u2 is such a vertex. Then 
v2 prefers u1 to ~(0~) (whether or not v2 is matched under p). Also v2 is ur’s first choice, 
implying that p(ur) cvl u2. Thus, the stability condition (4) for the pair {ur, v2} is not 
satisfied and the matching is not stable. 0 
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3. Stable matchings and linear inequalities 
Vande Vate [21] and Rothblum [20] initiated the study of stable matching 
problems from the perspective of polyhedral combinatorics by characterizing the 
stable matchings of stable marriage problems as the extreme points of a certain 
polytope. Here, we extend this approach to general stable matching problems by 
defining, for each such problem, a corresponding polytope that we call the fractional 
stable matching polytope. We prove some properties of fractional stable matching 
polytopes, for example we show that they are nonempty and that their extreme points 
are half-integral. Fractional stable matching polytopes will remain the main object of 
concern of the subsequent sections of this paper. 
The stable matching polytope SM(G; P) of a stable matching problem (G; P) is 
defined as the convex hull of the incidence vectors of the stable matchings. A descrip- 
tion of the stable matching polytope for stable marriage problems in terms of explicit 
linear inequalities was recently obtained by Vande Vate [21] and Rothblum [20]. It 
resembles Theorem 2.1 which applies to matchings in a bipartite graph. 
Theorem 3.1 (Rothblum). Let (G; P) be a stable matching problem where the graph 
G = (V, E) is bipartite, then the stable matching polytope SM(G; P) is described by the 
following linear inequality system: 
1 X,,” < 1 for each u E V, 
U E N(C) 
XII,” 3 0 for each {u, u} E E, 
C X.,i + C X”,j + x,,, 3 1 for each {u,~} EE. 
i >u D i 5 u 
where i >, u denotes (i E N(u): i >, u} and j >v u denotes {j E N(u): j >, u) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
Constraints (7) are called the stability constraints. The result of Gale and Shapley 
[7], showing that every stable marriage problem has a stable matching, proves that 
when G is bipartite the polytope described by (5H7) is nonempty. The first step in 
establishing Theorem 3 in Rothblum [20], was the observation that a matching is 
stable if and only if its incidence vector is an integer solution of (5)-(7). We next extend 
this observation to the case where the acceptability graph is not necessarily bipartite. 
Lemma 3.2. The incidence vectors of stable matchings are precisely the integer solutions 
of inequalities (5H7). 
Proof. Obviously, an integer vector satisfies constraints (5) and (6) if and only if it is 
the incidence vector of a matching in the corresponding graph. We further observe 
that stability asserts that if {u, u} E E and the first two terms on the left-hand side of (7) 
vanish, i.e. u is not matched to a vertex it prefers to u and u is not matched to a vertex it 
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prefers to v, then necessarily u and o are matched to each other, i.e. x,,, = 1. So 
stability is equivalent to (7). 0 
Lemma 3.2 implies that all vectors in the stable matching polytope must satisfy 
inequalities (5H7). But in the nonbipartite case these inequalities, in general, do not 
describe the stable matching polytope. The following example proposed by Isaak [ 121 
shows that the polytope defined by (5H7) can have fractional extreme points, and can 
therefore be larger than the stable matching polytope. 
Example 1. Let V = { 1, 2, 3,4}, G = Kq, i.e., G is the complete graph with four 
vertices, and let the profile P be defined by the following preference table, where to 
each vertex there corresponds a row that lists its neighbours in decreasing preference 
order: 
P(1) = 2,4, 3, 
P(2) = 3,4, 1, 
P(3) = 1,4, 2, 
P(4) = 1,2, 3. 
Since the graph is complete and has an even number of nodes, it follows that in any 
stable matching p all vertices must be matched. Otherwise, if there is a vertex v so that 
p(v) = v, then there is at least one other vertex u with ,u(u) = u and the stability 
condition (4) for the pair {u, v} is not satisfied. The only three matchings under which 
all vertices are matched are: pi = {{1,4}, (2, 3}}, pL2 = ((1, 3}, {2,4}) and 
p3 = ({ 1,2}}, {3,4}}. It is easily verified that of these only ,ni is stable. We also 
observe that the system of inequalities (5)(7) for this example is 
c x,,,< 1 foreachvEV, 
U E N(a) 
x2,3 + x2,4 + x1,2 2 l> 
x1,2 + x1.4 + x1,3 3 1, 
x1,2 + x1,4 3 1, 
x1,3 + x3,4 + x2.3 > 1, 
x2,3 + x1,4 + x2.4 3 1, 
x1,3 + x1,4 + x2.4 + x3,4 3 1, 
x,., Z 0 for each {u, v) E E. 
As ~1 is the only stable matching, its incidence vector is the only integral solution of 
the above system of linear inequalities (see Lemma 3.2). Further, it is easily seen that 
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the above system of inequalities reduces to 
x1.2 + x1.4 = 1, 
x1.2 + x2,3 = 1, 
x2,3 + x3,4 = l> 
x2.3 + x1,4 B 1, 
x1,3 = x2,4 = 0, 
x1,2, x1.49 x2.3, x3,4 2 0. 
And we can parametrize the solutions of this system as 
x1,2 = x3.4 = % 
x1.4 = x2.3 = 1 - LX, 
xl,3 = x2,4 = O, 
where 
l/2 < c( < 1. 
Hence, the polytope defined (5H7) has precisely two extreme points y and z which are 
given by 
yl.4 = Y,,, = 1, Yl,, = yl,, = y,,, = y3,4 = 0, 
and 
21.4 = zl,2 = z2,3 = 23.4 = 112, Zl, 3 = 22.4 = 0. 
We note that the points in the stable matching polytope must obviously satisfy 
Edmonds’ odd set constraints. But, the fractional extreme point z in Example 1 does 
not violate the odd set constraints. Thus, adding the odd set constraints (3) to 
constraints (5)(7) will not necessarily give a description of the stable matching 
polytope. 
The next example gives a stable matching problem that does not have a stable 
matching, though the corresponding polytope defined by constraints (3), (5H7) is 
nonempty. 
Example 2. Consider the stable matching problem (G; P) where G has six vertices, 
I’= {1,...,6}, and P is given by the following preference table: 
P(1) = 2, 3, 5,6, 
P(2) = 3,4, 6, 1, 
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P(3) = 4, 5, 1, 2, 
P(4) = 5, 6, 2, 3, 
P(5) = 6, 1, 3,4, 
P(6) = 1,2,4,5. 
It can be verified that the vector x with coordinates x,,, = l/2, for (u, u} E {{1,2}, 
(2,3}, {3,4}, {4,5}, {5,6}, (6, 1) > and x,,, = 0 for all other arcs {u, ul satisfies con- 
straints (3), (5H7); and by exhaustive search we can check that there is no stable 
matching for the problem. 
The above two examples raise the question of whether it is possible, by introducing 
additional sets of linear inequalities, to give an NP-description of the stable matching 
polytope SM(G; P) for an arbitrary stable matching problem (G; P), (see the dis- 
cussion following Theorem 2.2). Recently Feder [6] proved that the optimal stable 
matching problem, i.e., the problem of finding a stable matching that maximizes 
a linear function, is NP-hard. Feder’s result makes the search for any NP-description 
of the stable matching polytope hopeless unless NP = co-NP. This statement follows 
from a theorem by Karp and Papadimitriou [13] (see also [15, p. 3321). 
Let (G; P) be a given stable matching problem. We then call solutions of (5H7) 
fractional stable matchings. The set of all fractional stable matchings will be called the 
fractional stable matching polytope and will be denoted FSM(G; P). We next derive 
some properties of this polytope. 
Theorem 3.3. Let (G; P) be a stable matching problem. Then the fractional stable 
matching polytope FSM(G; P) is a nonempty polytope containing SM(G; P). Further, if 
x is an extreme point of FSM(G; P) then x is half-integral. 
Proof. We first observe that Lemma 3.2 shows that all incidence vectors of stable 
matchings of (G; P) are in FSM(G; P), immediately implying that SM(G; P) 
G FSM(G; P). 
To see that FSM(G; P) # 8, let G = (V, E). We will construct a bipartite graph 
d = (F, l?) and will define a stable matching problem (6; P^) on this graph. For each 
vertex u E V, create two vertices m,, w, in p and for each edge (u, u} E E create the 
edges {m,, w,} and ( m,, w,} in l?. The profile P^ is next defined by having w, <,,,, w, and 
m, q,,, m, whenever s cU t. As G is bipartite, the stable matching polytope SM(C?; p) is 
nonempty and is the solution set of constraints (5H7) applied to (6; P^). Let 2 E R’ be 
a point in SM(C?; P). We obtain x E RE be defining, for each {u, u} E E, 
x”, ” = t(%nu,w” + %l”,WJ 
We will show that x E FSM(G; P). 
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Let {u, u} E E. Using the definition of P^ and the fact that ,9 satisfies constraints (7) 
for (6; P^) for the pairs {m,, wVj and {m,, w,> in E^, we have that 
and 
Combining these two inequalities shows that 
By the definition of x, the above is equivalent to 
C xu,i + C xu,j + xu,o 2 l, 
i >” c‘ i >, u 
proving that x satisfies constraints (7) for (G; P). The corresponding conclusions for 
constraints (5) and (6) applied to (G; P) follow trivially. So, x belongs to FSM(G; P), 
establishing the nonemptiness of this polytope. 
To see that the extreme points of FSM(G; P) are half-integral, suppose that x is an 
extreme point of FSM(G; P). We obtain ;i- E E^ by defining, for each {u, II} E E, 
A 
Xln,,W” = 2 m, . Wu = X,,” 
Then 
1 
w, >,“,, M?. 
gm,,w,+i* F, aM,,,u+am”,wU=.C xu,j+i~I.xi.u+xu.~~ l. 
‘I WY ” I >,> u Y 
Hence, 2 satisfies (7). Clearly z? also satisfies (5) and (6), hence A E SM(G; P^) and 
therefore 2 can be expressed as a convex combination of extreme points of SM(g; p). 
Let jk, for k E K, be extreme points of SM((?;p) such that 
where c, E K Ak = 1 and, for each k E K, A, > 0. For k E K, we define yk E K, we define 
yk E RE by letting, for each {u, o} E E, 
Y 
k _I.+k 
U,L’ - z (Y,,, VW + K,, UJ. 
Then the earlier arguments show that yk E FSM(G; P) and, as 9” is integral by 
Theorem 3.1, it follows that yk E (0, l/2, l}“. Further, for each (u, u} E E 
H.G. Abeledo, U.G. Rothblum 1 Discrete Applied Mathematics 54 (19941 1-27 11 
Thus, 
x = 1 &yk. 
kcK 
Since the right-hand side of the above equation is a convex combination of the yk’s, 
the extremality of x for FSM(G; P) implies that the yk’s are identical and, therefore, 
x coincides with them. In particular, x E (0, l/2, 1}” as asserted. 0 
The last conclusion of Theorem 3.3 will be refined in Theorem 6.12, where we 
characterize the extreme points of FSM(G; P). 
Hartmann independently proved in [9] the nonemptiness of FSM(G; P) and the 
existence of half-integral solutions in FSM(G; P). We also note that the half-inte- 
grality of the extreme points of FSM(G; P) resembles Theorem 2.3 of Balinski. But, in 
contrast with Theorem 2.3, FSM(G; P) can have an extreme point x where the set of 
edges Ei12(x) contains even cycles, as is shown by the extreme point z of Example 1. Of 
course, not all half-integral points in FSM(G; P) are extreme points. In particular, if 
(G; P) has more than one stable matching then the midpoint between the incidence 
vectors of any two stable matchings is a half-integral stable matching which is not an 
extreme point of FSM(G; P). Of course, the half-integrality of the extreme points of 
FSM(G; P) implies that Phase I of the simplex method can be used to compute 
half-integral points of FSM(G; P). 
We next obtain a necessary condition for half-integral points to be in FSM(G; P). 
We will need an additional definition. Let C = vi, v2, . . . , ok be a cycle in G, we say that 
C has cyclic preferences in (G; P) if 
vi-l <v, vi+l for each i = l,...,k 
or 
vi-l >v, Oi+l for each i= l,...,k, 
where uk + 1 = vl. The following theorem identifies a common property of all half- 
integral points in FSM(G; P). 
Theorem 3.4. Let (G; P) be a stable matching problem and let x be a half-integral point 
in FSM(G; P). Then the set of edges EI12(x) forms vertex disjoint cycles, each having 
cyclic preferences. 
Proof. The matching constraints (5) imply that a vertex is incident to at most two 
edges in Eljz(x). Also, if a vertex is incident to a edge in EI12(x) then it is not incident 
to an edge in E,(x). Hence, the edges in E1,2(~) can be partitioned into vertex disjoint 
paths and cycles. 
Let {v i, v2} be an arbitrary edge in E1,2(~). The constraint (7) applied to {vi, v2} 
implies that C; ,,, v2 x,l,i + Cj >,, L(1 xv2.j > l/2. By possibly interchanging the roles of 
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ui and vz we conclude, without loss of generality, that Cj, v1 X”,,j > l/2. It follows 
that there exists a vertex u3 E V such that {v2, u3} E Eiiz(xrand u3 >U2 ui. Next, as 
X “,,“Z = X “2.U3 = l/2 constraint (5) implies that x”,,i = 0 for i # vl, 21~. In particular, as 
v3 '"2 vl~ Cj >-, w *w,j = 0. So the stability constraint (7) applied to {vZ, u3} implies 
that Cj >_“I x0,, j > l/2. Thus, there exists a vertex v4 E V such that (u3, v4} E Ei12(x) 
and v4 >V3 u2. Repeating this argument, inductively, we obtain a sequence of edges 
{Vi, Vi+l> E Ei12(x), for i 3 2, such that the set of vertices {k E I? x0& > 0}= 
{vi-i,ui+i} and vi-1 <vi vi+i. Since the number of edges is finite, we conclude that 
a vertex must recur. Let v, = v, be the first recurring vertex where s < t. Then 
t - s 3 2. If s > 2, then 
{us- i,&+i} = {k E I’: x,,k > 0) = {kE I’: x,,k >o} = {+I, &+I}, 
implying that v,_ 1 is a recurring vertex, a contradiction which proves that s = 1. So 
the sequence forms a cycle which has cyclic preferences, whose edge are in E,,,(x) and 
contain the edge {v,, v2}. Hence, every edge in E,,,(x) belongs to such a cycle. 0 
4. Stable matchings and linear programming 
Roth et al. [18] use duality theory of linear programming to derive new proofs of 
some results on the stable marriage problem. We extend their approach here to the 
nonbipartite case, obtaining additional insight on the structure of fractional stable 
matchings. The proofs of the following Lemmas are similar to results in [18] and are 
included for completeness. 
Henceforth, let (G; P) be a given stable matching problem with acceptability graph 
G = (V, E). Consider the linear program: 
(LP) maximize 1 X”,” 
{u.ul 6E 
subject to x E FSM(G; P). 
The dual problem has variables (a, y) E R” x RE, and is given by 
(DLP) minimize C ~1, - C yU,” 
DEV {u,u} E E 
subject to CI, + CI, - 1 yj,. - i& yi,v - yU,” > 1 for each {a, u} E E, 
jc.0 I; 
a, > 0 for each v E I’ 
Y”,” 2 0 for each (u, v} E E. 
There is an unusual property of the above pair of primal and dual linear programs: 
each fractional stable matching is an optimal solution of (LP) and is also included in 
an optimal solution of (DLP). 
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Lemma 4.1. Each x E FSM(G; P) is an optimal solution of(LP) and (tl, x) is an optimal 
solution of (DLP), where 
~1, = j l s(U, Xi.0 for each v E V. (8) 
Proof. Let x E FSM(G; P) and let a be defined by (8). Let {u, U} E E, to see that (CC, x) is 
feasible for (DLP), note that 
ati+a~- C xi,u- C Xj,v-xx,,u 
i <” D j <,, u 
=i~~xi.~+j~~Xj,~+x~.~~l~ 
” ( 
where the last inequality holds since x satisfies (7). To see that solutions x and (CY, x) 
are optimal for (LP) and (DLP), respectively; observe that 
so x has the same objective in LP as (CC, x) has in DLP. Thus, the weak duality theorem 
of linear programming implies that x is optimal for (LP) and (CY, x) is optimal for 
(DLP). 0 
The following result was proved independently by Hartman [9]_ 
Theorem 4.2. There is a partition of V into p and V’, such that for each fractional 
stable matching x 
C Xj,“=O ifVEV”, 
j E N(c) 
C Xj,“=l ifVEV’. 
j E NW 
Proof. For 6 E {0, 1} let V6 = {V E V: CjcN(u) xj,” = ~,VX E FSM(G; P)}. Suppose v is 
a vertex such that u $ V”. Then CjE &J(v) xi, v > 0 for some fractional stable matching x’. 
By Lemma 4.1 there is an optimal dual solution (tl’, x’) with a: > 0. Note that &, is the 
dual variable that corresponds to the primal constraint (5) for u. Hence, by the 
complementary slackness theorem, for every optimal solution x for (LP) 
C Xj," = 1. 
j E N(o) 
As Lemma 4.1 shows that every x E FSM(G; P) is optimal for (LP), we conclude that 
each such x satisfies (9), i.e., v E V’. 0 
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As a consequence of Theorem 4.2, we obtain sufficient conditions for nonexistence 
of a stable matching. 
Corollary 4.3 For each x E FSM(G; P) 
c X,,, = l/2 C 1 Xj,“= lV’(/2. 
(U. 0) E E UE v’jcN(0) 
In particular, if 1 V’ ( is odd, then (G; P) does not have a stable matching. 
Proof. By Theorem 4.2, each x E FSM(G; P) has 
c X,,, = l/2 C C Xj,” = 1 V’1/2. 
{UJ} E E 06 VI jcN(v) 
If 1 V’( is odd, it is clear that no x E FSM(G; P) is integral. Cl 
The following corollary specializes Theorem 4.2 to stable matchings, showing that 
the set of matched vertices for every stable matching is the same. The result was 
previously proved by Gusfield and Irving [S]. Their proof relied on Irving’s combina- 
torial algorithm for solving the stable matching problem. 
Corollary 4.4. Let p be a stable matching. Then p(u) = v ifv E p and p(u) # v ifv E V’. 
Theorem 4.5. Let {u, u) E E. If there exists some x’ E FSM(G;P) with XL,” > 0, then for 
every x E FSM(G;P): 
1 xi,u + C xi,u + xu,v = l. (10) 
i >.v i >,,u 
Proof. By Lemma 4.1 (LX’, x’) is an optimal solution of (DLP), where CI’ is defined from 
x’ via (8). Recall that yU,” = XL,, is the dual variable that corresponds to the primal 
constraint (7) for the pair {u, u}. Since xh,, is positive, by the Complementary slackness 
theorem, every optimal solution of (LP) satisfies (7) for the pair {u, U} as an equality. As 
Lemma 4.1 shows that every x E FSM(G;P) is optimal for (LP), we conclude that each 
such x satisfies Eq. (10) for the pair {a, u}. 0 
The following two corollaries specialize Theorem 4.5 to stable matchings. The first 
one was originally proved by Gusfield and Irving [S]. The second extends the 
decomposition principle of Knuth [14] from stable marriage problems to stable 
matching problems. 
Corollary 4.6. If vertices u and v are matched in a stable matching p, then there is no 
stable matching that both u and v prefer to p. 
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Proof. If vertices u and v are matched in a stable matching p with incidence vector x, 
then x,,, = 1 > 0. Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 4.5 combine to show that Eq. (10) holds 
for the incidence vector of any stable matching. Now suppose both u and u prefer their 
outcomes in stable matching ,u’ to being matched to each other. Let x’ be the incidence 
vector corresponding to ,u’, then 
i&xi,u +jTux;,u +xl,u = 22 
contradicting (10). 0 
Corollary 4.7. Let p and p’ be two stable matchings and dejine V(p) z {u E V p(v) >” 
p’(u)} and V(p’) = { II E V: ,u’(u) >, p(v)}. Then p and ,u’ map V(p) onto V(p’) and V(p’) 
onto V(p). 
Proof. It follows from Corollary 4.4 that l+‘) and V(p) are contained in V’. Let x be 
the incidence vector of p and let x’ be the incidence vector of p’. Suppose u = p(u) and 
U’ = p’(u). Since x,., = 1 > 0, by Theorem 4.5 
ibex:.. +jFux;.. + 4” = 1. 
Now u E V(p) if and only if 
c Xi,” + x:,, = 0 
j >.v 
and u E V(p’) if and only if 
c x;,, = 1. 
i >.v 
Thus, u E V’(p) if and only if p(u) = u E V(,U’). The other statement follows sim- 
ilarly. q 
5. The median property 
It was observed by John Conway (see [14,8]) that the set of stable matchings for 
a stable marriage problem forms a distributive lattice under a natural partial order. 
This lattice structure was extended to all points in the stable matching polytope of 
a stable marriage problem by Roth et al. [lS]. The lattice structure of the stable 
marriage problem does not carry over to the general stable matching problem, but, in 
this case, Gusfield and Irving [S] prove that there is a (weaker) semilattice structure. 
For this purpose, Gusfield and Irving [S] show that given a triplet of stable matchings 
a stable matching can be constructed via assigning each vertex its median choice over 
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its outcomes in the three matchings. The outcome is then a matching which is called 
the median of the three original matchings. Here we show how this construction can be 
extended to the set of fractional stable matchings. 
Let S be a set of three real numbers. Recall that the median of& denoted med S, is 
defined as the second largest (or smallest) number among the three elements of S. The 
following two simple lemmas will be useful for our development. 
Lemma 5.1. Suppose r E R. Let (al, a& (b,, b,) and (cl, c2) be three real solutions ofthe 
equation y, + y, = r. Then med{a,, bl,cl} + med(a2,b2,c2} = r. 
Proof. We may assume that a, < bl d cl and, hence, med{a,,b,,c,} = b,. Since 
(b, - al) + (bz - az) = 0, it follows that aI < b, if and only if b2 < u2. Similarly, 
(b, - cl) + (b2 - c2) = 0 implies that b, < cl if and only if c2 < b,. Thus, 
c2 d b, d a2 and med{a,, b2, c2} = b2. So, med{a,,b,,c,} + med{a2,b2,cz}= 
b, + b2 = r. II 
Lemma 5.2. Suppose Y E R. Let (al, u2), (b,, b2) and (c1,c2) be three real solutions ofthe 
inequality y, + y, 2 r. Then med{aI,bI,cl} + med{a2,bz,c2} 3 r. 
Proof. We may assume that a, < bl < cl and, hence, med{ar, br,cl} = br. Then 
bI + b2 2 r and b, + a2 3 aI + a2 3 r implying that bl + min{a,,b,} 3 r. Since 
med {a2, b2, c2) 3 min {a2, b2}, we conclude that bl + med {a,, b2, CZ} b r. 0 
The following lemma will allow us to extend the concept of median to triplets of 
fractional stable matchings. 
Lemma 5.3. Let x1, x2, x3 E FSM(G; P) be three fractional stable matchings and let 
{u, v} E E. Then 
med C ~i,~:k=l,2,3 C xi,i:k=l,2,3 
i >.v i >.v 
= med c x:,~: k = 1,2,3 c x%,j: k = 1,2,3 
j 2, U j>,u 
(11) 
Proof. We consider two cases. First, suppose that x,,, = 0 for every x E FSM(G;P). 
Then, x:,, = x& = x,3,+ = 0 implying that, for k = 1,2,3: 
c 4, = c XL. 
i >.o i >.v 
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Thus, 
med 1 xi,i: C X~,i: k= 1,2,3 
i&v i >“,a 
as the two above medians are of the same three numbers, respectively. A similar 
argument, exchanging the roles of u and v, shows that 
med C xi,; 1 xt.j: k = 1,2,3 , 
j >, ” j au 
and (11) follows immediately. 
Next, suppose that there exists x’ E FSM(G;P) such that XL,, > 0. Then Theorem 4.5 
shows that for every x EFSM(G;P) 
1 xu,i + C xu,j + xu,o = l. 
i >.v j a u 
In particular, this applies to xi, x2, x3. So for k = 1,2,3 
c Xf,i + 1 Xi,j = 1. 
i9.v j >,,u 
Hence, by Lemma 5.1 
x$k=1,2,3 1 Xk,,j:k=1,2,3 
j ? u 
and a symmetric argument shows that 
med Cx$k=l,2,3 xx!,,:k=1,2,3 
j&U i >.v 
Subtracting (14) from (13) and rearranging the terms establishes (11). 0 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
Let xi, x2, x3 E FSM(G; P) c RE be three fractional stable matchings. We define the 
median of xi, x2 and x3, denoted med {xl, x2, x3], component-wise by letting for each 
{u,u} EE 
= med C X~,i: k = 1,2,3 . 
i z.v 
(15) 
In order for this definition to apply we have to argue that the right-hand side of (15) is 
symmetric in u and u. Indeed, Lemma 5.3 shows that this is the case. 
A useful property of the median of triplets of fractional stable matchings is given in 
the next lemma. 
18 H.G. Abeledo, U.G. Rothblum / Discrete Applied Mathematics 54 (1994) 1-27 
Lemma 5.4. Let x1, x2, x3 E FSM(G; P) be three fractional stable matchings. Then 
c Cmed{x1,x2,x3}lu,i = med 2 x:,~: k = 1,2,3 (16) 
i >.v i 2.0 
and 
iF” Cmed{ X1,x2,X3}]u,i = med 2 xi,; k = 1,2,3 
Y i z.u 
(17) 
Proof. The definition of med{x’, x2, x3} in (16) implies that 
1 Cmed{x’,~~,X~}L,~ 
i 2,” 
C x:,; k = 1,2,3 
j >“.i 
= C med{ C xi,j: 
i >.v j&i 
k = 1,2,3} - &med{ zix:,j: k = 1.2,3). (18) 
Observing that 
{ ( ~ix:.j,~ix~.j~~ix~,j): i 3~ “) = { (~ix:,i,~ix:.i,~ix~,j): i >uv}, 
Y Y Y 
we conclude that 
C med{ 1 xi,j: k = 1,2,3} = C med{ C xt,j: k = 1.2.3}. 
i2.v j >“,i i >.u j >.i 
Combining (18) and (19) we see that 
= ,z med{ .z L 2.u 1 >.i 
= med C xi*j: k = 1,2,3 , 
j&V 
_ C med{ C xi,j: k = 1,2,3] 
i >.v j 2.i 
(19) 
where the last equality follows by simply cancelling identical terms. So (16) has been 
established. 
To prove (17) we consider two cases. First, we consider when (i E VI i >u v} = 8. 
Then (17) holds trivially since both sides of the equation are null. For the second case, 
let v’ 3 min, { i E K i >,v}. Then (17) coincides with (16) when u’ replaces II. 0 
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We now show that the median of three fractional stable matchings is also a frac- 
tional stable matching. 
Theorem 5.5. Let x1, x2, x3 belong to FSM(G; P). Then med {xl, x2, x3} E FSM(G; P). 
Proof. Let u E V. By Lemma 5.4, 
iego) Cmed ’ 
X1,X2,X3}v,i] =med 1 x:,i: k= 1,2,3 < 1, 
i iEN i 
where the last inequality holds since each xk satisfies (5) for v. Thus, med (x’, x2, x3} 
verifies constraints (5). 
Next, let {u, U) be an edge in E. Then, for each k = 1,2,3, 
JLxi,i 2.1 4i.i 
._” ’ 1 >,,u 
implies 
med &x:,i: k = 1,2,3 2 xi,i: k = 1,2,3 . 
i >.c‘ 
Thus, 
[med (x1, x2, x3)],,, c 
1 X~,i: k = 1,2,3 c x:.~: k = 1,2,3 
i&v i >.v 
and, therefore, med (x’, x2, x3} satisfies the nonnegativity constraints (6). 
Finally, each xk verifies the stability constraints (7). Hence, for k = 1,2,3, 
,c x:, + c 4,” 21 
t 3.0 jav 
and therefore, by Lemma 5.2, 
med c xi,; k = 1,2,3 
j >,.L’ 
By, combining this inequality with Eqs. (16) and (17) of Lemma 5.2, we see that 
C [med{x’,x2,x3)]u,i + 1 [med(x’,xZ,x3j],,j >, 1. 
i2.v j ;‘.u 
Hence, med (x1, x2, x3) verifies the stability constraint (7) for (u, u} and the proof that 
med(x1,xz,x3} EFSM(G;P) is completed. tl 
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6. Extreme fractional stable matchings 
We have seen in the earlier sections that the stable matching polytope SM(G;P) is 
contained in the fractional stable matching polytope FSM(G;P), and that the extreme 
points of the latter are always half-integral. In the current section we refine these 
results. First we characterize the half-integral vectors in FSM(G;P) which are in 
SM(G;P), and second, we characterize the extreme points of FSM(G;P). 
We continue to let (G;P) be a stable matching problem where G = (I’,E). For 
x E FSM(G;P), we define the mappings 0, and a, from the set V into itself by 
gX(u) = min,{u EN(u): x,,, > 01, 
(TX(u) = max,{u EN(u): x,,, > 0}, 
where we remind the reader that according to the definition given in Section 2, 
min, 0 = max, $!I = v. We recall from Theorem 4.2 that Vis partitioned into V” and V’, 
where, for 6 E (0, l}, I” = {U E K CjeN(“,xj,v = 6 for all x EFSM(G; P)j. 
We next show that 8, and 8, are the inverse of each other. The result extends parts 
of Lemmas 2 and 3 of [20] which concern the stable marriage problem. 
Lemma 6.1. Let x E FSM(G;P). Then, fir u, u E V, 
2, = c,(u) if and only if u = c?,(u). 
Proof. First, consider u E I’(‘. Then u = C?,.(U), and the assertion holds trivially. 
Next, consider u E V’. Now, if u = q,(u), then x,,, > 0 and u E V’. Thus, 
Ci>.v x,,i = &EN(u) x,,; = 1. Also, by Theorem 4.5 and the assertion x,,, > 0, implies 
that 
C xu,i + C xv,j + xu,u = l. 
Hence, Cj >,. u xv,j = 0 and therefore u 3, r?,(u). As x,,, > 0, we conclude that 
u = 6,(u), establishing one direction of the lemma. For the other direction, suppose 
u = C?,(U). Then Cj ,. V x”,j = 0 and the stability constraint (7) for {u, u) implies 
Ci >_.v xu,i +  xu,o , > 1. Hence, by (5) and the assertion x,,, > 0, u = b,(u). 0 
We next define for each x E FSM(G; P) the set of edges T(x) c E given by 
T(x) = ( {u, o} E E: u A, ax(u) and u 2, a&)}. (20) 
Of course, it immediately follows that 
E+(x) ST(X). (21) 
The next result shows that for each x E FSM(G; P), the vertices that are contained in 
the edges of T(x) are precisely those in V’. 
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Lemma 6.2. Let x EFSM(G; P). Then VTCxj = V’. 
Proof. We observe that (21) implies I” c V’rCxJ. Next, suppose v E V”. Then 
c uENCvJ x,,, = 0. It follows that for each u E N(v), the stability constraint (7) for the pair 
{u, U} implies xi ,” V X,, i = 1, thus, v <U ax(u) and, by (20), {u, v} $ T(x). Hence, 
v4 VT(x). 0 
Let T c E be a subset of the edges of G and let Gr = (I’,, T) be the subgraph of 
G spanned by T. We observe that T specifies a stable matching problem (GT;PT), 
where PT denotes the restriction of P on GP For v E VT, we denote by NT(v) the set of 
neighbours of v in Gr, i.e. NT(v) = {U E V: {u, v} E T}. The definition of VT implies that 
NT(v) # 8 for all v E Vr+,. Also, as NT(v) 5 N(v), max, NT(v) and min, NT(v) are well 
defined. Finally, for x E RE we denote by xT the subvector of x consisting of the 
coordinates indexed by T, i.e., xT is the orthogonal projection of x on RT. 
Let x E FSM(G; P). The stable matching problem determined by x is defined to be 
(GT(x);PT(x)), where T(x) is given by (20). In particular, Lemma 6.2 shows that 
G T(x) = tvT(x)r T(x)) = (V’, T(x)). The next result shows that for each vertex v E Vi, 
min, NT@](v) and max, NTCxJ (v) are equal to qX(v) and C?,(U), respectively. 
Lemma 6.3. Let x E FSM(G;P) and let v E VT@.) = V’. Then 
min, NT@,(u) = c,(v) and max, N&v) = 6,(v). (22) 
Proof. As v E I”, xc’,(Tx(U, > 0 and, by (21) we conclude that am END and 
CX(v) E NT&v). Now if w <I; a,(v) then (20) implies {v, w} $ T(x). Further, if w >v C,(v) 
then &a.wxu,j = 0 and the stability constraint (7) for {v, w} implies that 
Cj>xux w,j 3 1, thus u <,,, a,(v) and, by (20), (0,~) $ T(x). AS ax(v) and CX(v) are in 
NT@,(u) and each w Satkfying w -co $(v) or w >v C?,(V) iS not in NT@], we have that (22) 
follows. 0 
Corollary 6.4. Let x E FSM(G; P) and let e E E,(x). Then G;,, is a connected component 
of G~(xp 
Proof. Let e = (u, u}. Then ax(v) = C,(v) = u and Lemma 6.3 implies that Nr(,.(v) = U. 
Similarly, NT(x)(U) = % 0 
Lemmas 6.1 and 6.3 give the following corollary. 
Corollary 6.5. Let x E FSM(G; P) and let {u, v} E T(x). Then 
u=minN 
” Tcx)(v) ifand ifonly u = m,ax N,(,)(U). 
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For a fractional stable matching x, the definition of T(x) via (20) and the above 
results show that the stable matching problem determined by x is a stable table for 
(G; P), as defined by Gusfield and Irving [S]. We note that stable tables play a major 
role in the polynomial algorithm Irving developed to solve the stable matching problem 
(see [S]). Stable tables are further studied with the tools of polyhedral combinatorics in 
Abeledo Cl], but are not used formally in the forthcoming development. 
Let x EFSM(G; P). We next consider the polytope FSM(GTcx); Pr(,,) c Rr@). de- 
fined by the linear system (5)-(7) applied to the stable matching problem (G,(,,; Pr(,,). 
The next result shows that all vectors in FSM(Gr(,,; Pr,,,) satisfy constraints (5) 
applied to (Gr+); Pr& as equalities. 
Corollary 6.6. Let x EFSM(G; P) and let y EFSM(G,(,,; P,,,,). Then, for each 
v E VT(x) = v’, CjdV,,x,(o)Yj,v = l. 
Proof. Let u E V” and let w = min, Nr(,,(v) # v. By Corollary 6.5, u = max, Nr(,,(w). 
Hence, constraint (7) applied to (Gr,,,; PTCxJ, for {u, w} E T(x), can be written as 
C(jsN,,,,(C.):j~~WJyj,~ A > 1. Since y satisfies constraint (5) for u, applied to (G,,,,; PTCxJ, we 
have CjsN,,,,(“)yj,” < 1. Combining these two inequalities implies, since {j ENS: 
j >,w} s NT(xJ(~), that CjEN~(.,(L’) yj,, = 1, establishing the assertion. 0 
For x E FSM(G;P), the following lemma provides a representation of the fractional 
stable matching polytope of (GTcx); P,(,,). 
Lemma 6.7. Let x EFSM(G; P), let y E RE satisfy E+(y) c T(x). Then y EFSM(G; P) 
if and only ~~YTH E FSM(GW; Pw,). 
Proof. As E+(y) c T(x), y trivially satisfies (5) for v E I’\Vr,,, = p. Also, since 
E + (y) E T(x), we trivially have that yrcX) satisfies (5)-(7) with respect to (G,(,,; P,(,,) if 
and only if y satisfies, with respect to (G; P), (5) for all v E VTcXJ = V’, (6) for all 
pairs {u, u} EE and (7) for all pairs {u, u} E T(x). So it remains to show that if 
YTW E FSWGw; P,,,,) then y satisfies (7) for {u, v} EE\T(x). 
So, assume that yr(,.) E FSM(Gr(,,; PTCxj ) and let {u, v} EE\T(x). By (20) and a 
possible exchange of the roles of u and v, we may assume that w = a,(v) >” U. 
Then CjGN(v)~j,, > 0 and therefore, by Theorem 4.2, v E V’. From Lemma 
6.3, w = min, NrJv) and, by Corollary 6.6, ~{j~NTlr; j 2,,w) $j,v = 1. Thus, 
1; jrN(v): j 2, w) Yj.v = 1 and, since w >V U, it immediately follows that y satisfies the 
stability constraint (7) for {u, u}. 0 
By restricting the conclusion of Lemma 6.7 to integral vectors we obtain the next 
result, proved originally by Gusfield and Irving [S] in the context of stable tables. 
Corollary 6.8. Let x E FSM(G; P). Then any stable matching of(GTCxj; PTtxJ) is a stable 
matching of (G; P). 
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Corollary 6.9. Let x EFSM(G; P) and let {T’, T2, . ..Tr} be the partition of T(x) such 
that GT1, G Tz, . . ,Gr’ are the connected components of GTCxJ. Then x is an extreme point 
of FSM(G; P) if and only ifxTC is an extreme point of FSM(GTC; PTL). 
Proof. We first show that x is an extreme point of FSM(G; P) if and only if xTcX) is 
a extreme point of FSM(GTCX,; P,(,,). Assume that xTcxJ is an extreme point of 
FSM(G,(,,; P,(,,) and that x has a representation x = (1 - a)y + az where 0 < CI < 1 
and y,z E FSM(G;P). Then the nonnegativity of x, y and z assures that 
E+(y) c E+(x) E T(x) and E+(z) c E+(x) s T(x); hence by Lemma 6.7 yTcx) and 
+(x1 arc in FSM(Gr&‘r&. As xTcX) = (1 - cc)y,(,, + CIZ~(~), we conclude from the 
extremality of xr+) that xTcXJ = yTcx) = zrtX), implying that x = y = z. Alternatively, 
assume x is an extreme point of FSM(G;P) and xrcX) = (1 - a)y’ + CIZ’, for 0 < a < 1 
and y’, z’ E FSM(G,(,, ;P,(,,). Let y and z be the extension of y’ and z’ to RE obtained 
by setting the additional coordinates to zero. Then, as E+(x) z T(x), we conclude that 
x = (1 - a)y + tlz. So, the extremality of x implies x = y = z, assuring that 
XT(~) = YW) = Y’ and xTcx) = zTcx) = z’. 
We next observe that no pairs of variables corresponding to different components 
of C&(x) are in the same equation defining FSM(G,(,,; P,,,,). Hence, FSM(G,(,,; P,,,,) 
is the Cartesian production of FSM(G,,; PTL), for i = 1, . . , r. It immediately follows 
that x rtxi is an extreme point of FSM(G,(,,; P,,,,) if and only if, for i = 1, , r, xTC is 
an extreme point of FSM(GTI; PT,). 0 
The next lemma is key to this section. 
Lemma 6.10. Let x E FSM(G; P) n (0,112, l}” have the representation x = CkeK &yk, 
where &tK & = 1 and, for k E K, yk E FSM(G; P) and & > 0. Then, for each k E K and 
for each vertex v which is contained in an odd cycle of GTCx,. 
Proof. Let C be an odd cycle of GTcxJ and let K be the vertex set of C. Then 
vc z VT(x) = V”. Now, for v E I$ the connected component of GTcx) containing v con- 
tains Vc; hence that component does not consist of a single edge and Corollary 6.4 
implies x,,, # 1 for all u EN(V). Then x E (0, l/2, l}E implies x,,, E (0, l/2} for all 
urn. As VEI”, we conclude that x,,;~(,) = x,,,~(,) = 1\2 and x,,, = 0 for all 
u EN(V)\ {OX(U)9 ax(v)}. 
As x = &&&yk and the &‘s are positive we have that E+(yk) E E+(x) for each 
k E K. So, for v E Vc, yi,, = x,,, = 0 for all u E N(v)\ {~?~(v),a,(v))-. Also, as 
yh eFSM(G;P) and v E Vc & V’, we conclude that for v E I+, y:,F(,., + !I:.., ,,., _I 
=c. JEN(L’J~L.,J = 1. Thus, if suffices to show that yt,,,,, = l/2, for all 11 E I$ and for all 
kcK. 
Let k E K. We will show that if u and v are adjacent vertices on the cycle C, then 
Yt,,;(,, + Y:,,;(u) 3 1 (23 
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We consider two cases. First assume that x,,, > 0. Then v E{~,(u),(T,(u)}, Now, if 
u = 5*(u), Lemma 6.1 implies that u = cX(v) and, therefore, 
establishing (23). Alternatively, if v = q,(u), then Lemma 6.1 implies that u = (T,(V) and 
a symmetric argument establishes (23). It remains to consider the case where x,,, = 0. 
In this case, since {u, u} E T(x), Lemma 6.3 implies that Q~(u) <,, v cU a,(u) and 
rrX(u) <,u <” a,(v). Hence, the stability constraint (7) applied to {u,u} shows that 
Yt,Cx(u) + Yi,tix(o) = C Yf2.i + C + Y:,j + Yt.0 3 l> 
i >“o .i au 
establishing (23). 
We next argue that 
with equality holding if and only if y,k,,;(,, = l/2 for every u E Vc. This conclusion is 
trite if y&(,,, > l/2 for every u E Vc. So, assume that for some u E I’& yt,,,,, < l/2 and 
we will show that (24) holds at strict inequality. Now, enumerate the vertices in I$ so 
that u is the first vertex and each pair of consecutive vertices are adjacent in C. In 
particular, the last vertex, say v, is adjacent to u and (23) implies that yi,a,cv, > l/2. As 
IV,1 is odd the vertices of &\{v} can be partitioned into disjoint pairs of adjacent 
vertices. As (23) holds for each such pair, we conclude that (24) holds as strict 
inequality. 
Finally, by multiplying (24) by & and summing over K, we see that 
We conclude from the positivity of the &‘s that (24) must hold as equality for all k. As 
we have seen, this conclusion means that yi,,;(,, = l/2 for all v E Vc and our proof is 
completed. 0 
The next theorem characterizes the half-integral stable matchings in FSM(G; P) 
that belong to the stable matching polytope SM(G; P). 
Theorem 6.11. Let x E FSM(G; P) n (0, l/2,1>“. Then x E SM(G; P) if and only ifGTcxl 
is bipartite. Further, in this case x can be represented as x = 1/2(y + z), where y, z are 
the incidence uectors of two stable matchings. 
Proof. If GTcxJ is not bipartite it contains an odd cycle and Lemma 6.10 implies that 
x cannot be expressed as a convex combination of integral vectors of FSM(G; P), i.e, 
x $ SM(G; P). 
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Conversely, suppose Gr(,.) = (V’, T(x)) is bipartite. Let M, W c V’ be two sets of 
vertices that give a bipartition for Gr+), i.e., V’ = M v W, M A W = 8 and all edges in 
T(x) contain a vertex in M and a vertex in W. Let Pi, prr denote the following subsets 
of T(x): 
PM = {{ma&n)}: REM), 
/_Lw = ((w, cTx(w)}: w E W}. 
Then pM and pLw are subsets of E+(x) z T(x). Further, Lemma 6.1 shows that if 
w = c,(m,) = cX(m2), then m, = c,(w) = m,; thus p,,, is a matching. To prove that pM 
is a stable matching for (Gr(,, ;P,,,,), we observe that any corresponding blocking pair 
in T(x) must involve a vertex m EM, but for each such vertex m, Lemma 6.3 
implies that PM(m) = max,Nr,(m) >,, w for every w ANY. Thus no vertex in 
M can belong to a blocking pair and, therefore, pM is a stable matching. Exchanging 
the roles of M and W, we also conclude that p w is a stable matching. Hence, by 
Corollary 6.8, .nM and yw are stable matchings for (G; P). 
Let Y, z E SM(G; P) n (0, l}” denote the incidence vectors of pLM and pw, respective- 
ly. It suffices to prove, for each {u, U} E E, that 
XtlJl = 1/2(Y,,” + ZU,“). (25) 
We observe that if {u,u} E E\T(x) then x,,, = y,,, = z,,, = 0 and (25) holds. For the 
pairs {m, w} e T(x) we consider three cases. First, if x,,, = 0 then (25) holds since 
pLM, prr c E+(x). Next, if x,,, = l/2, then the assertion x E {0,1/2,1>” implies that one 
and only one of the following holds: either w = c?,(m) >,,, qX(m) or w = o_,(m) <,,, C,(m). 
In the first case y,,, = 1 and z,,, = 0, and in the other case Lemma 6.1. implies 
Y ,,,+ = 0 and z,,, = 1, and both cases verify (25). Finally, if x,,, = 1 then, 
C,(m) = ax(m) = w and cX(w) = c,(w) = m, implying that y,,, = 1 and z,,, = 1. 
Therefore, (25) is established and, thus x eSM(G; P). 0 
We arrive to our characterization of the extreme points of FSM(G; P). 
Theorem 6.12. Let (G; P) be a stable matching problem and let x E FSM(G; P). Then x is 
an extreme point of FSM(G; P) ifand only x is half-integral and each component of GTCx) 
with edges in EIi2(x) contains an odd cycle. 
Proof. By Corollary 6.9 we may assume, without loss of generality, that Gr+, is 
a connected graph. We first observe that if E,(x) # 0, the assumption that GTcxj is 
a connected graph and Corollary 6.4. imply that T(x) = E,(x) and that this set 
consists of a unique edge e. We conclude that FSM(G; P) consists of a single point and 
the two assertions of our theorem’s statement are trivially satisfied by this point. 
Alternatively, assume that El(x) = 8. We first prove necessity. Let x be an extreme 
point of FSM(G; P). Then, by Theorem 3.3, x is half-integral and, since E,(x) = 8, it 
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follows that x E {0,1/2}e. Suppose GTcx) does not contain an odd cycle. Then GTcxj is 
bipartite and Theorem 6.11 implies that x has a representation x = 1/2(y + z), where 
Y, z E FSM(G; P) n (0, I}“, contradicting the extremality of x. 
To show sufficiency, let x be half-integral and let GTcx) contain an odd cycle C with 
vertex set Vc. Then E,(x) = 8 implies x E (0, 1/2}E and as V&) = V’, we have for each 
u E vTcXJ that x,,~~(,) = x0,, cV) = l/2. To see that x is extreme for FSM(G; P), suppose 
yk EFSM(G;P) and A,+ 10: for k EK, al-e such that X = xkoKAkyk and I&& = 1. It 
follows that for k E K, E+(yk) E E+(x) = El12(x). As yk EFSM(G; P) we conclude that 
for each u E VT(xI = V’ 
k 
YU,O,(V) YI?,o;(“) = + k 
USN(U) 
We call a vertex v E VTcxJ determined if ~k,,,~(~) = yi,bX(Vj = l/2 for all k E K, i.e., all 
yk’s coincide with x on the edges incident to a. To establish the theorem we next show 
that all vertices are determined. By Lemma 6.10, the set of determined vertices is 
nonempty as the vertices in Vc are determined. 
We next show that if u is a determined vertex and {a, V} E T(x), v is also determined. 
We consider two cases. First assume that x,,, > 0. Then x,,, = l/2 and as u is 
determined yk,, = x,,, = l/2 for all k E K. Further, either u = ax(v) or u = (T,(v) and 
therefore we conclude from (26) that Y!J,~(~) = yk,,,;,,, = l/2 for all k E K. So, v is indeed 
determined. We next consider the case where x,,, = 0. We then conclude from (20) 
that v >, q,(u) and u >” a,(v). As yk E FSM(G; P) for all k E K, the stability constraint 
(7) for yk and {u,v} implies that 
k 
YU, p &) + Yk,,,_&, 2 1 (27) 
Since u is determined we have yi,zX;;cU, = l/2, hence (27) means that yk,,,(,, 3 l/2 for all 
k E K. We conclude that 
< 1 Akyk,,,x(o) = x”,,x(v) = 1/2; 
keK 
hence the positivity of the 2,‘s implies that ~k,,,-~(“) = l/2 for all k E K. So, L’ is indeed 
determined. 
We concluded that the set of determined vertices is nonempty and connected. As 
G T(x) is connected it follows that every vertex in V& is determined, implying that 
x = yk for each k E K, and thereby establishing the extremality of x. 0 
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